FEDERALIST No. 31

The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning the General Power of Taxation)

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, January 1, 1788.

To the People of the State of New York:

IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary

truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings

must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent

to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind.

Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some

defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the

influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of

this nature are the maxims in geometry, that ``the whole is greater

than its part; things equal to the same are equal to one another;

two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right angles

are equal to each other.'' Of the same nature are these other

maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect

without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the

end; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object;

that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect

a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are

other truths in the two latter sciences which, if they cannot

pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet such direct

inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable

to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of common-sense, that

they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind, with a

degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible.

The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted

from those pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly

passions of the human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt

not only the more simple theorems of the science, but even those

abstruse paradoxes which, however they may appear susceptible of

demonstration, are at variance with the natural conceptions which

the mind, without the aid of philosophy, would be led to entertain

upon the subject. The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter, or, in other

words, the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing, extending even

to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among geometricians, though

not less incomprehensible to common-sense than any of those

mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of infidelity

have been so industriously leveled.

But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far

less tractable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that

this should be the case. Caution and investigation are a necessary

armor against error and imposition. But this untractableness may be

carried too far, and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or

disingenuity. Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of

moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of

certainty with those of the mathematics, yet they have much better

claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men in

particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them. The

obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the

reasoner than in the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not

give their own understandings fair play; but, yielding to some

untoward bias, they entangle themselves in words and confound

themselves in subtleties.

How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be

sincere in their opposition), that positions so clear as those which

manifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the

government of the Union, should have to encounter any adversaries

among men of discernment? Though these positions have been

elsewhere fully stated, they will perhaps not be improperly

recapitulated in this place, as introductory to an examination of

what may have been offered by way of objection to them. They are in

substance as follows:

A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to

the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to

the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible,

free from every other control but a regard to the public good and tothe sense of the people.

As the duties of superintending the national defense and of

securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence

involve a provision for casualties and dangers to which no possible

limits can be assigned, the power of making that provision ought to

know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the

resources of the community.

As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of

answering the national exigencies must be procured, the power of

procuring that article in its full extent must necessarily be

comprehended in that of providing for those exigencies.

As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of

procuring revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in

their collective capacities, the federal government must of

necessity be invested with an unqualified power of taxation in the

ordinary modes.

Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to

conclude that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the

national government might safely be permitted to rest on the

evidence of these propositions, unassisted by any additional

arguments or illustrations. But we find, in fact, that the

antagonists of the proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing in

their justness or truth, seem to make their principal and most

zealous effort against this part of the plan. It may therefore be

satisfactory to analyze the arguments with which they combat it.

Those of them which have been most labored with that view, seem

in substance to amount to this: ``It is not true, because the

exigencies of the Union may not be susceptible of limitation, that

its power of laying taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as

requisite to the purposes of the local administrations as to those

of the Union; and the former are at least of equal importance with

the latter to the happiness of the people. It is, therefore, as

necessary that the State governments should be able to command the

means of supplying their wants, as that the national government

should possess the like faculty in respect to the wants of the Union.

But an indefinite power of taxation in the LATTER might, and

probably would in time, deprive the FORMER of the means of providing

for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to the

mercy of the national legislature. As the laws of the Union are to

become the supreme law of the land, as it is to have power to pass

all laws that may be NECESSARY for carrying into execution the

authorities with which it is proposed to vest it, the national

government might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State

objects upon the pretense of an interference with its own. It might

allege a necessity of doing this in order to give efficacy to the

national revenues. And thus all the resources of taxation might by

degrees become the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entire

exclusion and destruction of the State governments.''

This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the

supposition of usurpation in the national government; at other

times it seems to be designed only as a deduction from the

constitutional operation of its intended powers. It is only in the

latter light that it can be admitted to have any pretensions to

fairness. The moment we launch into conjectures about the

usurpations of the federal government, we get into an unfathomable

abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning.

Imagination may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered amidst

the labyrinths of an enchanted castle, and knows not on which side

to turn to extricate itself from the perplexities into which it has

so rashly adventured. Whatever may be the limits or modifications

of the powers of the Union, it is easy to imagine an endless train

of possible dangers; and by indulging an excess of jealousy and

timidity, we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute scepticism

and irresolution. I repeat here what I have observed in substance

in another place, that all observations founded upon the danger of

usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of

the government, not to the nature or extent of its powers. The

State governments, by their original constitutions, are invested

with complete sovereignty. In what does our security consist

against usurpation from that quarter? Doubtless in the manner of

their formation, and in a due dependence of those who are to

administer them upon the people. If the proposed construction of

the federal government be found, upon an impartial examination of

it, to be such as to afford, to a proper extent, the same species of

security, all apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought to be

discarded.

It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State

governments to encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as

probable as a disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights

of the State governments. What side would be likely to prevail in

such a conflict, must depend on the means which the contending

parties could employ toward insuring success. As in republics

strength is always on the side of the people, and as there are

weighty reasons to induce a belief that the State governments will

commonly possess most influence over them, the natural conclusion is

that such contests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of

the Union; and that there is greater probability of encroachments

by the members upon the federal head, than by the federal head upon

the members. But it is evident that all conjectures of this kind

must be extremely vague and fallible: and that it is by far the

safest course to lay them altogether aside, and to confine our

attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are

delineated in the Constitution. Every thing beyond this must be

left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they will

hold the scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped, will always

take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the

general and the State governments. Upon this ground, which is

evidently the true one, it will not be difficult to obviate the

objections which have been made to an indefinite power of taxation

in the United States.