The Same Subject Continued

(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to

the Common Defense Considered)

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, December 25, 1787.

To the People of the State of New York:

IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of

the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid

of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most

other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere

general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible

designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I

have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it

seems to originate in a presupposition that the people will be

disinclined to the exercise of federal authority in any matter of an

internal nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the

inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and

external, let us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that

disinclination in the people. Unless we presume at the same time

that the powers of the general government will be worse administered

than those of the State government, there seems to be no room for

the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the

people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their

confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be

proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It

must be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but these

exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot

be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or

demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged of by general

principles and maxims.

Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these

papers, to induce a probability that the general government will be

better administered than the particular governments; the principal

of which reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election

will present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people;

that through the medium of the State legislaturesgwhich are select

bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of the national

Senategthere is reason to expect that this branch will generally be

composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances

promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the

national councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by

the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional

ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in

smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public councils, beget

injustice and oppression of a part of the community, and engender

schemes which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or

desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust.

Several additional reasons of considerable force, to fortify that

probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more critical

eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to

erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until

satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the

federal government is likely to be administered in such a manner as

to render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no

reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union

will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in

need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws

of the particular members.

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the

dread of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it.

Will not the government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due

degree of power, can call to its aid the collective resources of the

whole Confederacy, be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment

and to inspire the LATTER, than that of a single State, which can

only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a

State may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to

the government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as

to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. If

this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from

irregular combinations of individuals to the authority of the

Confederacy than to that of a single member.

I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be

the less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the

more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in

the ordinary exercise of government, the more the citizens are

accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their

political life, the more it is familiarized to their sight and to

their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which touch

the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs

of the human heart, the greater will be the probability that it will

conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is very

much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses

will generally have but little influence upon his mind. A

government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be

expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference

is, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the

citizens towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by

its extension to what are called matters of internal concern; and

will have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the

familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it

circulates through those channls and currents in which the passions

of mankind naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the

violent and perilous expedients of compulsion.

One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government

like the one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity

of using force, than that species of league contend for by most of

its opponents; the authority of which should only operate upon the

States in their political or collective capacities. It has been

shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the

laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are the

natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as

often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war

and violence.

The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority

of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several

States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy

of each, in the execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that

this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all

distinction between the sources from which they might proceed; and

will give the federal government the same advantage for securing a

due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of

each State, in addition to the influence on public opinion which

will result from the important consideration of its having power to

call to its assistance and support the resources of the whole Union.

It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the

Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its

jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the

observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and

judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath.

Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective

members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national

government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY EXTENDS;

and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.%n1%n

Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the consequences

of this situation, will perceive that there is good ground to

calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the

Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of

prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may

deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is

certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of

the best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to

provoke and precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But

though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume

that the national rulers would be insensible to the motives of

public good, or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them

how the interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be

promoted by such a conduct?

PUBLIUS.

1 The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will

tend to the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will,