FEDERALIST No. 24

The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

For the Independent Journal.

To the People of the State of New York:

To THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal

government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national

forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I

understand it right, is this,gthat proper provision has not been

made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an

objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and

unsubstantial foundations.

It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general

form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of

argument; without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in

contradiction to the practice of other free nations, and to the

general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing

constitutions. The proprietory of this remark will appear, the

moment it is recollected that the objection under consideration

turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE

authority of the nation, in the article of military establishments;

a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State

constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.

A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at

the present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan

reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two

conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction, that

standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it

vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without

subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of the

legislature.

If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be

surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the

case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the

LEGISLATURE, not in the EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be

a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people

periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had

supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in

respect to this object, an important qualification even of the

legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the

appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer

period than two yearsga precaution which, upon a nearer view of it,

will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up

of troops without evident necessity.

Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed

would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would

naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement

and pathetic declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It

must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have,

in all the preceding models of the constitutions which they have

established, inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this

point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to

all this apprehension and clamor.

If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the

several State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment

to find that TWO ONLY of them%n1%n contained an interdiction of

standing armies in time of peace; that the other eleven had either

observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express terms

admitted the right of the Legislature to authorize their existence.

Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some

plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would

never be able to imagine, while any source of information remained

unexplored, that it was nothing more than an experiment upon the

public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to

deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be

ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that he would be likely

to find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact

between the States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a

solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the

existing Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions

against military establishments in time of peace; and a departure

from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent

which appears to influence these political champions.

If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey

of the articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be

increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the

unexpected discovery, that these articles, instead of containing the

prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous

circumspection, restricted the authority of the State legislatures

in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of

the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility,

or ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding

these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and

unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a

fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their

country! How else, he would say, could the authors of them have

been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a

point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general

sense of America as declared in its different forms of government,

and in which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown

to any of them? If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man of

calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the

frailty of human nature, and would lament, that in a matter so

interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the

question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so

unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. Even such a man

could hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too

much the appearance of an intention to mislead the people by

alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments

addressed to their understandings.

But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by

precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer

view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will

appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in

respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be

improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of

society, would be unlikely to be observed.

Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet

there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of

confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into

our rear, are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain.

On the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements,

are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain.

This situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands,

belonging to these two powers create between them, in respect to

their American possessions and in relation to us, a common interest.

The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as

our natural enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to

fear from us, and most to hope from them. The improvements in the

art of navigation have, as to the facility of communication,

rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain

and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A

future concert of views between these nations ought not to be

regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity

is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between

France and Spain. And politicians have ever with great reason

considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of

political connection. These circumstances combined, admonish us not

to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the

reach of danger.

Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has

been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western

frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be

indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages and

depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be

furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by

permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is

impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The

militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their

occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in

times of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or

compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of

service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious

pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the

scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as

ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps

in the pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of

peace; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small.

Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the

impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such establishments,

and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and

prudence of the legislature.

In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay,

it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their

military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be

willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to

their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient to

increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which

our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be,

particular posts, the possession of which will include the command

of large districts of territory, and facilitate future invasions of

the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be

keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it

would be wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any

instant seized by one or the other of two neighboring and formidable

powers? To act this part would be to desert all the usual maxims of

prudence and policy.

If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on

our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a

navy. To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and

for the defense of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons.

When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its

dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons

for that purpose; but where naval establishments are in their

infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an

indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the

arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.

PUBLIUS.

1 This statement of the matter is taken from the printed

collection of State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina

are the two which contain the interdiction in these words: ``As

standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY

OUGHT NOT to be kept up.'' This is, in truth, rather a CAUTION than

a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland

have, in each of their bils of rights, a clause to this effect:

``Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be

raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE''; which

is a formal admission of the authority of the Legislature. New York

has no bills of rights, and her constitution says not a word about

the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions

of the other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions

are equally silent. I am told, however that one or two States have

bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but that

those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this